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vABSTRACT 
Combatant ships in the Fifth Fleet sphere of operations depend upon 
Military Sealift Command (MSC) to supply stores and fuel while they are 
underway. Scheduling the delivery of supplies has predominately been customer 
driven, which has led to inefficiencies in the utilization of MSC resources. The 
introduction of Replenishment at Sea Planner (RASP) in 2013 provided a new 
tool that is expected to increase efficiency of scheduling operations by reducing 
scheduling errors and manpower needed for fulfillment. 
The purpose of this research is to analyze data from Fifth Fleet collected 
before and after RASP with a goal of establishing a baseline efficiency in Combat 
Logistics Force (CLF) ship utilization. Supply and demand models were built over 
the data sets, presenting an interesting view of the disproportion of available 
commodity available to customers. Efficiencies were compared before and after 
RASP, resulting in a recommendation that the Fast Combat Support Ship (AOE) 
be the ship of choice due to better efficiency and cost to deliver commodity to the 
warship in the Fifth Fleet area of responsibility. The trends from the data 
were mostly inconclusive, however; as a result, this paper recommends 
expanding the research years for further data analysis to include 2011, 2012, 
2014, and 2016. 
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A. EARLY REPLENISHMENT AT SEA 
Prior to the use of underway replenishment, coaling stations were required 
to refuel ships far from home. Nineteenth and early twentieth century Britain 
established a vast network of forward stations and coal ships to ensure operating 
continuity in their empire. These early warships relied completely upon coal and, 
as such, coaling stations were a matter of strategic importance. As turn of the 
twentieth century Navy logistician, C. Theo Vogelgesang stated, “A fleet of 
battleships is powerful only when its constant mobility is assured, when we are 
able to guarantee the free and unrestricted movement of that fleet to a given 
theater of war, and within that area after it has arrived” (Brown, 2010). 
The United States, lacking the expansive refueling network of our British 
counterparts, became interested in underway replenishment around 1900. One 
of the first experiments, devised by Spencer Miller, took place between the collier 
Marcellus and the battleship Massachusetts. In this experiment, a taut 
suspension cable and a quick release hook connected the ships. Improvements 
to this system continued for the next decade. In 1917, USS Maumee (AO-2) is 
credited with the first operational underway replenishment under the direction of 
then Chief Engineer Chester Nimitz. This initial operation successfully transferred 
around 130 tons of coal over four attempts (Miller, 1900).   
B. MODERN REPLENISHMENT AT SEA 
Replenishment at sea (RAS) operations have come a long way compared 
to these early coal predecessors. Today, refueling ships are capable of 
transferring fuel, cargo and personnel via connected replenishment. This task is 
typically conducted with ships connected by a tensioned wire at a distance 
between 140 to 180 feet. Because the ships are connected, it is imperative that 
speeds are matched perfectly, often to within accuracies involving shaft 
revolutions, and are conducted at speeds between 10 and 14 knots. Transfer 
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capacities vary between classes of refueling ship, but modern refueling ships are 
capable of meeting the demand required for any ship in the U.S. or coalition 
inventory.  
C. MILITARY SEALIFT COMMAND 
Military Sealift Command (MSC) is responsible for delivering the 
commodities needed to sustain American and coalition warships abroad. Located 
in Norfolk, Virginia, MSC is responsible to U.S. Transportation Command for 
defense appropriation matters and U.S. Fleet Forces command for Navy-unique 
matters (Military Sealift Command [MSC], 2015). MSC has five geographic 
commands that comprise: Atlantic, Pacific, Europe, Middle East, and Far East. 
Serving in a support role, MSC's main stakeholders include United States Fleet 
Forces Command (USFF), Surface Forces Command (SURFOR), and the 
Component Commands. Other stakeholders include Navy Supply Systems 
Command (NAVSUP), and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). 
1. Combat Logistics Force Concept of Operations for Load 
Management 
Standardization of load management is critical to ensure timely and 
efficient delivery of necessary logistics to the fleet. Fleet variance, such as 
weather patterns, customer optempo, political landscape and distance between 
ports, are challenges logistics officers face. The focal point of theater support is 
the embedded Combat Logistics Officer (CLO) within each Combined Task Force 
(CTF) organization. Their role is to ensure optimized supply chain management 
in their respective Area of Operations (AOR). The Combat Logistics Force (CLF) 
Business Enterprise Model further provides for standardization, gives direction 
for load management, and is tailored to specific AOR needs by the AOR 
Commander (Military Sealift Command [MSC], 2010, p. 41). The CLF fleet 
primarily consists of Fast Combat Support Ships, Fleet Replenishment Oilers, 
and Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ships (MSC, 2010). 
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2. Station Ship vs. Shuttle Ship 
Station ships remain on station with the strike group and are capable of 
keeping pace with the carrier when they transit. During high-tempo operations, 
time alongside is an important tactical consideration. Station ships are able to 
deliver all commodities (Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM), Aircraft Fuel (JP5), and 
cargo) simultaneously, thereby minimizing the overall time of the operation.  
Shuttle ships, in contrast, deliver fuel between the station ship and port. 
Depending on the AOR and the situation, shuttle ships may also be used in the 
station ship role. This continuous resupply of fuel and cargo by shuttle and 
station ships allows the strike group to remain on station as long as necessary to 
achieve its mission goals. Figure 1 depicts the various shuttle and station ships. 
 
Figure 1.  Shuttle vs. Station Ship Concept. Source: Military Sealift 
Command (MSC), (2010, p. 14). 
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a. Dry Cargo Ammunition Ships (T-AKE) 
The T-AKE is the most versatile ship in the CLF inventory. The T-AKE can 
be configured for either Ammo or Stores mode depending on the needs of the 
fleet that it is serving, and is capable of delivering fuel, ammunition or cargo. For 
the purposes of this study, we will use the T-AKE as a “Stores” configured ship. 
Typically, the T-AKE will be used as a shuttle ship but is capable of serving in 
either capacity as will be seen in this study of Fifth Fleet. 
b. Fast Combat Support Ships (T-AOE) 
The T-AOE is the preferred station ship due to its ability to keep up with 
the strike group's carrier. It has the ability to provide both fuel and cargo. The T-
AOE may also be used as a shuttle ship.  
c. Fleet Replenishment Oilers (T-AO) 
The T-AO is CLF's primary fuel platform as it has the largest capacity for 
DFM and JP-5 compared to all of the other CLF assets. The T-AO will primarily 
serve as a shuttle ship but may deliver supplies directly to customers depending 
on the AOR. It has no capacity for ammunition and limited cargo capacity. 
3. Replenishment at Sea Planner 
Prior to 2013, MSC scheduled its CLF assets by hand (or used a 
spreadsheet) each day. These schedules were prone to error and provided little 
feedback about the efficiency of delivery assets. Planning supply routes this way 
led to human errors, which would in turn lead to higher fuel costs than necessary. 
As a result of these errors CLF ships were required to operate at faster speeds to 
make engagements. The Replenishment at Sea Planner (RASP) program was a 
potential answer to this issue. RASP was developed under the auspices of 
Military Sealift Command and Office of Naval Research by Naval Postgraduate 
School and is a tool that Fleet staff can use to develop more fuel-efficient daily 
tasking for CLF ships in an operational theater. It is a decision support tool that 
aids CLF vessel schedulers in the planning, assessing, and execution of various 
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courses of action by CLF vessels to support combat customers. It is underpinned 
by sophisticated operations research optimization tools that allow the most 
efficient shipping routes to be selected. RASP also allows for contingency routes 
to be created in the event that changes may be needed. RASP was placed into 
operation in 2013 in the Fifth Fleet AOR. 
D. PURPOSE 
Today's political and fiscal environment dictates responsible and efficient 
use of the resources entrusted to government agencies. The 2016 President's 
Budget showed an approximately 20% decrease from 2015 in Operations and 
Maintenance Funding from which the Navy pays its fuel costs (Operation and 
Maintenance Programs [O-1] Revolving and Management Funds [O-1] Revolving 
and Management Funds [RF-1], 2016). Fuel costs account for an enormous 
percentage of the Department of the Navy's annual budget at 11% (Lengyel, 
2007). 
There are some long-term options available to help reduce fuel costs 
through upgrades to ship engineering plants and the use of special paints 
designed to prevent drag through the water. The capital cost associated with 
these ideas is often expensive and may take years to implement. Also, the 
effectiveness of some measures may not be apparent without time consuming 
and extensive analysis of data that is not readily available. With decreasing 
budgets and deployed units remaining at their current optempo, increased 
efficiency is needed now. Implementing changes to how the Navy delivers its fuel 
and cargo and specifically to how MSC schedules its CLF resources can 
potentially have an immediate impact by increasing effectiveness while saving 
fuel costs.  
This purpose of this study is to establish a baseline understanding of what 
the historical efficiency of CLF assets has been in the Fifth Fleet AOR. Fifth Fleet 
was chosen due to the historically high amount of ship deployments to the area, 
to help ease calculations due to the few major ports that MSC uses, and because 
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RASP has been in use there for several years. Also, warships deployed to the 
Fifth Fleet AOR typically receive the majority of their fuel and supplies through 
RAS as opposed to receiving resources by pulling into port. Ideally, general 
concepts derived from this analysis may be applied to other AORs. Once a 
baseline has been established, it will then be compared to data retrieved from 
RASP. The comparison data will then be used to help understand and make 
recommendations for increasing scheduling efficiency of Fifth Fleet CLF assets 
and ultimately fuel cost saving measures to the Department of Defense. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter provides background information from related literature and 
studies. It begins with a broad understanding of the operational ideas the U.S. 
government uses when loading logistics ships. Next, the focus shifts to 
challenges that the government is encountering in meeting the increasing 
demand of operational warships and the potential impact of an excessive fuel 
consumption and an over-reliance on foreign fuel. Lastly, it uses literature to help 
define important matrices needed to understand efficiency in logistics ships. 
A. COMBAT LOGISTICS FORCE (CLF) LOAD MANAGEMENT CONCEPT 
OF OPERATIONS. 
As previously mentioned, MSC is responsible for the replenishment of 
warships while at sea and it accomplishes this through its CLF. The Concept of 
Operations (CONOPS) was issued in March of 2010 with the intent of 
standardizing load management policy. The ultimate goal is to provide the 
maximum operational support to warships with the appropriate commodity at the 
right time. 
1. Support and Sustainment Cycle 
Planning, execution, deployment and lessons learned comprise the four 
phases of the operation cycle. Planning will include pre-deployment conferences 
where stakeholders share needs and the initial load-out decisions for the 
deployment are made. The execution phase includes load-out of the vessel as 
previously determined and the transit to the operating area. The deployment 
phase refers to the warship deployment in the operating area as opposed to 
warship's logistic supporting asset. CLF platform deployments are from one to 
four years in forward operating areas. The events conducted during the 
deployment phase may include (MSC, 2010, p. 15): 
 Top off re-supply at first available re-supply port 
 Conduct Shuttle Ship operations 
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 Conduct “Race track” Underway Replenishment (UNREP) and 
Replenishment (RAS) events 
 Provide Embassy Support 
 Load/unload Fleet freight as required 
2. Pallet Load Management 
While CLF assets carry a wide range of items to support fleet combat 
ships, the depth of those items depends upon the AOR that the ships are 
operating in as mission requirements change significantly between geographic 
areas. Other factors may contribute to the load out of the CLF asset. These 
include CTF operational requirements, ship Master's safety concerns with 
respect to weather and stability and the ships schedule (MSC, 2010, p. 23). 
Figure 2 is a depiction of the general pallet load-out capacity by class. The 
values in this table were used as assumptions for this study's supply calculations. 
 
Figure 2.  CLF Total Pallet Position Capacity. Source: MSC (2010, p. 24).  
3. Fuel Load Management 
CLF assets normally carry Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM) and JP5 (Turbine 
Fuel, Aviation, High Flash Type with FSII, MIL-DTL-5624 Series) for delivery to 
warships (MSC, 2010, p. 27). Seven-inch hoses are normally used to transfer 






DRY *3266 *984 *325 100    
Freeze / Chill *1134 *1134 *400 128
HULL 285 285 103 103
Deck Load NA NA 100 100
Ammo **216690 FT3 **432740 FT3 **166023 FT3 0
Fleet Freight tbd tbd tbd tbd
FHA 45 45 NA NA
Total Pallet 
Positions 4730 2448 928 431
* Pallets are double stacked in most of the storerooms.
**  No Compatibility / NEW issues
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JP-5 which limits its ability to refuel aircraft carriers due to the vast quantities of 
JP-5 required. Nominal CLF ship fuel capacities are shown in Table 1. The 
values in this table were used as assumptions for this study's supply calculations. 
Table 1.   CLF Platform Fuel Capacity. Source: Military Sealift Command 
(MSC), 2010. 
 T-AKE T-AOE T-AO 
 Capacity Pump Rate Capacity Pump Rate Capacity Pump Rate 



















4. Total Asset Visibility 
Enterprise resource management is the standard for civilian corporations. 
Automatic shipping and order of supplies ensures minimum bureaucracy and 
more efficient use of resources. MSC implements this business model and has 
employed information technology systems ashore to serve as a catalyst to this 
process. Using these systems, CLF schedulers have visibility of all material 
aboard ship. Understanding current operations and historical demand, 
schedulers are able to plan ahead of needed orders and ensure CLF ships are 
available to meet the underway replenishment demand. This capability serves as 
an invaluable tool when faced with multiple ship demands (MSC, 2010, p. 42). 
B. CARGO SHIPS ROUTING AND SCHEDULING: SURVEY OF MODELS 
AND PROBLEMS 
David Ronen's essay on commercial carrier management operations 
suggests that the shipping of cargo "costs thousands of dollars a day and that 
significant savings can be achieved by proper fleet routing and scheduling" 
(1983, p. 119).  It is important to note that Ronen's essay is over 30 years old 
and costs likely have increased. As the world population continues to rise, 
international trade will continue to play an important economic role in world policy 
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and politics. International shipping is the cornerstone of successful trade. 
Approximately 90% of the world trade is accomplished through shipping and 
without it, the import and export of goods at its current level would not be 
possible. There has been much research in the operational management of 
shipping but it has mainly been devoted to land and air shipping with little 
attention being given to shipping via sea transport. The author suggests that 
there may be several reasons for this to include low visibility (truck carry most of 
the load in the United States), ship scheduling is less structured than standard 
vehicle scheduling, there is much more uncertainty in ship scheduling to include 
everything from market volatility to weather, and there is a long tradition in ocean 
shipping that makes the overall industry less open to new ideas (1983, p. 119). 
The three general modes of operation in shipping are liner, tramp and 
industrial. These are not well defined or mutually exclusive and several modes 
may happen at the same time (1983, p. 120). 
Tramp resembles taxi cab services where ships go where cargo is 
available. The cargo is usually a whole shipload with a single origin and one or 
two destinations. Liner is usually operating on closed routes with no voyage 
defined origin and destination because they load and unload in each port and 
depends on the quality of service to include frequency, transit time, and reliability. 
Ronen suggests that major modelling methods for liner must rely on simulation 
and heuristic decision rules (1983, p. 123). Industrial shipping is similar to private 
truck fleet operations. The owner of the cargo controls the fleet of ships and 
assures transportation of the organization's cargo and reduced costs. 
For our purposes, it would appear that the industrial operations model best 
fits with the MSC's business model and the goals of this research. Assuming a 
given fleet size, linear programming was used to minimize the total ballast 
(empty) leg of a voyage and therefore minimized overall costs (1983, p. 123). 
Ronen suggested, in 1983, that computerized models would help to minimize the 
complexity of scheduling operations. This has proven true with MSC as it 
attempts to increase efficiency with the RASP program. Furthermore, the author 
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gives practical advice such as avoiding unnecessary port costs by not pulling into 
ports over the weekend when cargo handling crews are not working.  
C. MARITIME ECONOMICS 
Maritime Economics, 3rd Edition by Martin Stopford explains the 
organization of the world shipping markets and describes the influence of 
shipping on world markets through history, the organization of sea transport and 
the determination of prices and freight rates. This study is particularly interested 
in the development of his supply and demand models and calculation of freight 
rates. The author describes ten variables in the shipping market model: 
 The world economy 
 Seaborne commodity trades 
 Average haul 
 Random shocks 
 Transport costs 
 World fleet 
 Fleet productivity 
 Shipbuilding production 
 Scrapping and losses 
 Freight revenue (2009, p. 136) 
The first five variables define demand while the last five describe the 
impact upon supply. Stopford defines final demand as the tonnage of cargo 
multiplied by average haul and states that efficiency should be included in the 
supply portion of the function (2009, p. 137). As productivity and efficiency are 
key to this research, the author's definition of productivity are also important. He 
states that productivity is a function of four factors to include speed, port time, 
deadweight utilization and loaded days at sea (2009, p. 155).  
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D. FUELING THE BALANCE 
“Fueling the Balance: A Defense Energy Strategy Primer” by Jerry Warner 
and P. W. Singer argues that the current energy crisis is much more than an 
environmental catastrophe but an urgent issue for strategic national security.  
The authors explore the relationship between U.S. petroleum based tactical 
operations and how the costs of fuel affect Department of Defense (DOD) 
planners and their budgets. They argue, “Their (fuel costs) availability and cost 
now significantly impact military budgets, combat mission execution, institutional 
capabilities, and, by implication, our national security” (Warner, 2008, p. 3). They 
address concerns that only a small amount of the budgeted fuel is consumed by 
actual combat vehicles but instead is mostly used to transport and deliver the 
fuel. This gross inefficiency is likened to Civil War era supply trains where half of 
the mule drawn wagons were used to transport hay to feed the animals (Warner, 
2008, p. 4).  
The report considers the opportunity cost associated with both the 
protection of these valuable commodities and the loss in the budget that may 
have been better spent. The authors acknowledge that some action has been put 
into motion but argue that current efforts are not enough to solve the issue as 
demand continues to rise. The report also acknowledges the challenges placed 
on policy makers and DOD budgets by explaining the impact on price fluctuations 
in fuel. They say, “Overall, each and every $10 increase in the cost of a barrel of 
oil increases the price of DOD operations by $1.3 billion. To put this into context, 
each $10 price increase is equivalent to a loss of almost the entire U.S. Marine 
Corps procurement budget” (Warner, 2008, p. 5). Warner and Singer recommend 
streamlining DOD energy management, investment in new technologies, and 
providing needed tools and resources to help establish organization culture 
change. 
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E. POWERING AMERICA'S DEFENSE 
“Powering America's Defense: Energy and the Risks to National Security” 
was released by the Center for Naval Analyses' (CNA) Military Advisory Board 
(MAD) in 2009. The report is a build on the original 2007 edition that explores 
energy choices the nation can make to enhance overall national security. It 
argues that U.S. dependence on fossil fuel undermines economic stability and 
weakens U.S. international political leverage with otherwise insignificant state 
actors. The CNA sets forth the following roadmap of priorities to better energy 
security: 
 Priority 1: Energy security and climate change goals should be 
clearly integrated into national security and military planning 
processes  
 Priority 2: DOD should design and deploy systems to reduce the 
burden that inefficient energy use places on our troops as they 
engage overseas  
 Priority 3: DOD should understand its use of energy at all levels of 
operations. DOD should know its carbon footprint  
 Priority 4: DOD should transform its use of energy at installations 
through aggressive pursuit of energy efficiency, smart grid 
technologies, and electrification of its vehicle fleet  
 Priority 5: DOD should expand the adoption of distributed and 
renewable energy generation at its installations 
 Priority 6: DOD should transform its long-term operational energy 
posture through investments in low-carbon liquid fuels that satisfy 
military performance requirements (2009, p. ix) 
This report strikes at the core of the need of a clear understanding of how 
the choices operators and, in the case of this study, schedulers make can have 
direct strategic impacts. The inefficient use of scarce resources creates a 
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domino-like effect at all levels of our government and ultimately to its primary 
stakeholders, the taxpayer. The CNA reports that there are high opportunity 
costs associated with over-allocating funds to cover fuel costs as some other 
programs may become under-funded (CNA, p. 23). These potential disruptions 
may be the cause for a lack of training or procurement. 
F. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ENERGY STRATEGY: TEACHING AN 
OLD DOG NEW TRICKS 
Colonel Lengyel's paper portrays the U.S. government as over-reliant on 
fossil fuels and suggests that a potential fuel crisis is looming. Lengyel (2007, p. 
7) states, “Energy is the life-blood of the US economy and dependence on 
imported energy is a looming national crisis.” First, he argues that energy use is 
the key enabler of U.S. military combat power and that the DOD must recognize 
the problem from a military perspective (2007, p. 8). His next argument is that the 
DOD must recognize this military vulnerability and that energy usage must be 
managed much like intelligence or logistics. Lastly, he recommends a long-term 
energy strategy and an energy chain of command (2007, p. 10).  
G. RUNNING AHEAD: FOUR YEAR PLAN 
Running ahead is a paper by Mr. Adrian Zavala who works in a consulting 
capacity for MSC Far East. The ideas presented in “Running Ahead: Four Year 
Plan” represent the basis for the methodology used in my research and analysis. 
This paper was written as an internal document for MSC and specifically 
modelled CLF operations. Zavala defines two basic provider models to support 
customers: high priority and pure logistics. In high priority, the goal is to ensure 
maximum operational capability for the customers, regardless of cost or 
efficiency. This is in contrast to the pure logistics model where efficiency is the 
priority and it is in this mode that costs savings can be achieved. The paper lays 
out a plan for each of the four years and suggests an over-arching shift to a 
culture that is consistent with efficiency and cost savings. Each member of the 
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organization has to understand the vision and direction that leadership is 
directing.  
Understanding the process of data collection, storage, dissemination and 
use is critical to making improvements in the process. Zavala defines “six 
fundamental objectives while maintaining cognizance of all forces which act upon 
technical hardware of the vessel” (2016, p. 5). These objectives are: 
 Assess Demand 
 Assess Supply 
 Maximize cargo loading per voyage 
 Minimize non-work periods, subject to demand 
 Minimize the fuel consumption per non-working period, subject 
supply and demand balance 
 Minimize Gallons per Tonne Mile per voyage 
By assessing each voyage and then putting all voyages within a defined 
period together, a picture of overall efficiency may be obtained. Figures 3 and 4 
depict the metrics used to assess demand and supply. 
 
Figure 3.  Demand: Required Information. Source: Zavala (2016). 
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Figure 4.  Supply: Required Information. Source: Zavala, 2016 
Zavala argues that data drives the process of attaining better efficiency 
but all data is not relevant and in order to be relevant it must answer two 
questions: “From what baseline year are we assessing?” and “Is relevant data 
being captured prior to our baseline year?” (2016, p. 9). Figure 5 depicts the 
linear efficiency function. 
 
Figure 5.  Efficiency vs. Logistics Models. Source: Zavala, 2016 
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III. DATA, MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter will describe the data sets used, to include why specific data 
sets were chosen, limitations encountered with these data sets, and external 
factors that may have contributed to later results. Complete variable descriptions, 
construction, and an explanation of assumptions are also included. 
A. DATA DEVELOPMENT  
The development of the data to include explanations of military and 
political operations during the years of consideration will be described in the 
following sections. 
1. 2009 and 2010 Pre-RASP Data Sets 
A major purpose of this study is to establish a baseline for comparison of 
pre-RASP versus post-RASP scheduling efficiencies. The 2009 and 2010 
scheduling years for the Fifth Fleet are close enough to the 2013 launch of RASP 
to still be relevant for this comparison. During 2009, Operations Wolf Pursuit, 
New Hope, Ninewa Resolve, and Legion Pursuit were taking place in Iraq in 
support of coalition forces and the Iraqi War (Understanding War, 2010). As 
such, the USS Theodore Roosevelt Carrier Strike Group (THRSG) conducted 
flight operations in support of ground forces. Likewise, operations in Afghanistan 
continued to require air support which was supplied from the THRSG. Later in 
2009, as troops were starting to be withdrawn from Iraq and focus shifted to 
Afghanistan, fewer flights were required from the carrier strike groups (CSG) in 
the Fifth Fleet AOR (CNN, 2016). The year 2010 showed continued support of 
operations in Afghanistan support by CSGs.  
This difference in operations provides for an interesting dynamic in 
required demand. For the purposes of this study, demand is defined as the actual 
cubic meters of commodity (DFM, JP5, or pallets of cargo) transferred from MSC 
supply ships to operational warships via replenishment at sea. Figure 6 depicts 
 18
calendar year 2009 quarter one required demand for dual operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
 
Figure 6.  Fifth Fleet AOR CY2009Q1 Total Demand 
The types of operations shift in 2010 requiring less air support from U.S. 
aircraft carriers and more coalition based freedom of navigation and power 
projection type missions. This is apparent from required demand and is depicted 
in Figure 7. Of note, 2011 was also initially analyzed by this study but was 
omitted due to time restrictions. 
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Figure 7.  Fifth Fleet AOR CY2010 Q2 Total Demand 
2. 2013 and 2015 Post-RASP Data Sets 
The 2013 and 2015 data sets were used because they are post-RASP 
initialization. Operations in the Fifth Fleet AOR are similar to those observed in 
2009 and 2010 with the focus now on bombing operations from U.S. aircraft 
carriers against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). This produces a 
hybrid type of demand where aircraft fuel increases the proportion of use by 
aircraft carriers while coalition freedom of navigation is still taking place. Figure 8 
depicts a sample of 2013 and 2015 demand. 
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Figure 8.  Fifth Fleet AOR CY2015 Q1 Total Demand 
B. DATA LIMITATIONS 
Prior to RASP, there were several opportunities for “bad” information to 
make its way into the overall data. Times, dates, and quantity of commodities 
transferred or received were based on reports submitted to MSC. These reports 
relied on both the accuracy of the ship making the report and the person entering 
the data into the data storage system. 
To build the model, it was necessary to pull each day's schedule (in excel 
file format) for the time periods analyzed in 2009 and 2010 and then transfer that 
data into a new Excel workbook. Because the schedule was built daily by hand 
prior to RASP, any changes that were not captured in that day's schedule were 
not available to transfer into the overall database and analysis. 
While some comments about commodity type and general operation are 
available, the reasons for scheduling a certain MSC asset for a replenishment at 
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sea or a reposition to another port remain with the scheduler alone and are not 
available for my analysis. An understanding of the train of thought of the person 
making the schedule would help with the overall understanding of efficiency 
percentages.  
Coalition ships, both warships and supply vessels, play a major part in 
operations in the Fifth Fleet AOR and add significantly to both supply and 
demand models. Limitations in the calculation of voyage utilization, vessel 
utilization, overall effective work, and freight rates were encountered in relation to 
U.S. coalition partners. While M.port data is available for many of their voyages, 
port calls to restock supply are not available making my current models 
ineffective. Definitions of these metrics follow in Section C of this chapter. 
C. EXPLANATION OF VARIABLES AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
1. M.Port 
The latitudes and longitudes of replenishment at sea locations are 
considered classified. To prevent an over classification of this study, M.port 
values were developed to apply distances in determining efficiency. M.port is the 
closest distance between a major port and a replenishment at sea area. The 
major ports in consideration for the Fifth Fleet AOR are Jebel Ali, Fujairah and 
Djibouti. Table 2 shows an example of how M.port data was applied to determine 
the distances required for this study.  
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1/9/2015 FUJAIRAH 0 0 0 95
1/10/2015 HURRICANE 130 17 0 0 130
1/11/2015 DEWEY 130 477 6 36
1/13/2015 GRIDLEY 130 1003 35 39
2/1/2015 THUNDERBOLT 130 27 0 0
2/2/2015 DEWEY 130 374 12 0
2/4/2015 CARL VINSON 374 0 2695 0 599
2/4/2015 DAUNTLESS 374 257 0 0
2/4/2015 BUNKER HILL 374 498 10 0
2651 2759 75 5486 729 374 1103 19% 66% 12%
2/5/2015 JEBEL ALI 0 0 0 0
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In example 1: 
 The CLF asset leaves Fujairah (FUJ) on its voyage. 
 The first RAS event is 130 NM away from FUJ. 
 The CLF asset leaves the first RAS event en route to the second 
RAS event. 
 The distance between RAS event one and two is 599 NM. 
 RAS event two is 374 NM away from Jebel Ali (JEB). 
 The total distance traveled for this voyage is the sum of distances 
traveled on the voyage from FUJ until the assets return to port in 
JEB (1103 NM). 
Using this process, I used M.port to calculate the distances for all voyages 
by CLF ships in the Fifth Fleet AOR for the years analyzed. 
2. Demand and Total Demand 
For this study, demand is defined as the total amount of commodities, in 
cubic meters, transferred from a provider asset to an operational warship 
multiplied by the M.Port for that operational warship for each replenishment at 
sea event. The total demand is the summation of all demand during the time 
frames being analyzed. There are three commodities considered: 
 Diesel Fuel Marine (DFM): This is the fuel used by warships for 
propulsion and miscellaneous services. 
 Turbine Fuel, Aviation, High Flash Type with FSII, MIL-DTL-5624 
Series (JP-5): This is the fuel used by aircraft 
 Pallets: This includes ordinance, stores, and all cargo needed for 
warship operations. 
The commodity data was sourced from the Center for Naval Analyses’ raw 
data for the Combat Logistics Force quarterly report. The initial data was 
reported in gallons and pallets transferred or received so conversions of .00379 
gal/m3 and 1.5 pallets/m3 were used for conformity. 
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3. Supply and Total Supply 
Supply, for this study, is defined as the product of the total cubic meter 
capacity of each provider vessel and the speed in knots which they are capable 
of attaining for the period they are available in theater, less the time they are 
unavailable during the time frames being analyzed. Total supply is the 
summation of all provider vessel’s supply during the period being analyzed.  
For example: A provider asset has a total carrying capacity of 29,037 m3, 
a maximum speed of 20 knots, and is in theater 30 days. Therefore: 29,037 m3 * 
20 kts * 24 hours * 30 days = 418,132,800 m3 * NM. Any time spent conducting 
maintenance or in yard periods would be subtracted from the total available days. 
For this study, a speed of 14 knots was used as the primary voyage speed used 
by CLF assets for later analysis of efficiency and freight rates. Using the 
minimum and maximum speeds of CLF assets allows for an analysis of minimum 
and maximum supply available during the time periods analyzed.  
4. Overall Effective Work (Efficiency) 
The overall effective work done by a CLF asset over a voyage is the 
product of how much of the possible capacity was utilized and how much of the 
total voyage distance travelled was used for actual work. Working distance 
travelled is the distanced travelled by the CLF asset to deliver goods at a RAS 
event. This is also known as the laden leg of the voyage. The non-working 
distance is the distance required to return to port and this is known as the ballast 
leg of the voyage. 
In Example 1, the working distance was the distance from FUJ to RAS 1 
and then the distance from RAS 1 to RAS 2 (729 NM). The distance to return to 
port in JEB of 374 NM counts as the non-working distance. This ratio of working 
and non-working legs of a voyage make up voyage utilization. In this example the 
voyage utilization would be: 
729 NM / (729 + 374) NM = 66% efficiency 
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The other part of overall effective work is the vessel utilization. In Example 
1, the CLF asset delivered a total of 5,486 m3 of commodities to its customers. 
The total capacity for this vessel is 29,037 m3. Vessel utilization is the ratio of 
these values. Therefore, vessel utilization for this voyage is 5,486 m3 / 29,037 
m3 = 19%. The overall effective work would be 19% * 66% = 12%. 
5. Freight Rates 
Freight rates take the efficiency process one step further. The goal of 
efficient military logistics operations is to ensure 100% operational capability of 
warships while saving tax payers as much as possible. The freight rate for a 
voyage is defined as the total amount of commodity, in m3, transferred divided by 
the total cost of the voyage. Total voyage cost is composed of transit costs (cost 
of fuel to transit the CLF asset, wages of employees, stores consumed, etc.) and 
port costs (cost of daily pier services, cost of tugs, costs to anchor, etc.).  
Transit costs for this study assume the provider asset transits at 14 kts 
and burns 16,750 gallons of fuel per day at $1.97 per gallon. Port costs vary from 
port to port and standard daily rates were derived from Logistics Support 
Services Repository (LogSSR) historical data. Table 3 depicts the calculation of 
freight costs using the data from Example 1. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
In order to compare pre-RASP versus post-RASP efficiencies, the overall 
effective work metric was modelled quarter over quarter, year over year, and 
class of ship over class of ship. The standard deviation of the cumulative 
percentages was then calculated for both data sets and for the above metrics. It 
was important to understand which factor in the overall effective work equation 
was driving the results. Voyage utilization and vessel utilization were modelled 
quarter over quarter, year over year, and class of ship over class of ship. 










































1982 833 130 963 7% 87% 6%  $           12,975  6 100500  $                 197,985   $             210,960   $                 106 
FUJAIRAH
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Next, freight rates were compared over pre-RASP versus post-RASP data 
sets. These rates were modelled quarter over quarter, year over year, and class 
over class. Finally, the standard deviation of the rates was calculated and 
compared to the data. Tables 4 through 10 depict the data sets used to model 
the statistical analysis.  
Last, total supply and demand was calculated for each period analyzed. 
Supply was calculated through each month by summing the products of total 
commodity capacity, days in theater, and a speed of 14 kts. The minimum and 
maximum theoretical supply was collared by using the minimum and maximum 
speeds of the CLF asset. The total supply of commodity in cubic meters was 
reduced by a factor of 10,000 to allow for a more digestible ratio when compared 
to demand. Total demand was calculated by summing the demand by each 
operational vessel in the Fifth Fleet AOR during 2009, 2010, 2013, and 2015. 
Figures 9 and 10 depicts the relationship between supply and demand for both 
pre-RASP and post-RASP periods. 
 
Figure 9.  Pre-Rasp Supply and Demand 
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Table 4.   Pre-RASP Efficiency Data Set 
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Table 5.   Post-RASP Efficiency Data Set 
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Table 6.   Pre-RASP Freight Rates 
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Table 11.   Post-RASP Voyage Utilization 
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IV. OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The main goal of this research was to establish baseline data sets for 
future research in the study of increasing efficiency of CLF assets. While this was 
accomplished, an opportunity to analyze and draw initial conclusions should not 
be forsaken. This chapter discusses these observations from the analysis of the 
data and presents initial derived conclusions. 
A. OVERALL EFFECTIVE EFFICIENCY OBSERVATIONS 
The 2009 and 2010 data set, as seen in Table 4, revealed an overall 
effective work (OEW) of 12% and 13% with standard deviations of 2% and 3% 
respectively. The class averages were 12% for the AO's, 13% for the AKE's and 
11% for the AOEs. Figure 11 depicts the averages broken down by individual 
ship over the period. 
 
Figure 11.  2009 and 2010 OEW by CLF Asset 
The 2013 and 2015 data set, as seen in Table 5, revealed an OEW of 
16% and 11% with standard deviations of 8% and 5%, respectively. The class 
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averages were 8% for the AO's, 18% for the AKE's and 22% for the AOE's. 
Figure 12 depicts the averages broken down by individual ship over the period. 
 
Figure 12.  2013 and 2015 OEW by CLF Asset 
B. VOYAGE UTILIZATION OBSERVATIONS 
Pre-RASP versus Post-RASP voyage utilization averages were effectively 
the same as seen in Tables 10 and 11. The 2009 and 2010 data set reveals a 
66% average with a standard deviation of 10%. The 2013 and 2015 data set 
average was 65% with a standard deviation of 8%. The ship class averages were 
slightly more variable but all numbers for both sets of data fell within one 
standard deviation. Figures 13 and 14 depict the CLF asset averages. 
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Figure 13.  2009 and 2010 Voyage Utilization by CLF Asset 
 
Figure 14.  2013 and 2015 Voyage Utilization by CLF Asset 
C. VESSEL UTILIZATION OBSERVATIONS 
Vessel utilization showed some variability between data sets as seen in 
Tables 8 and 9. The pre-RASP data revealed an overall average of 18% with a 
6% standard deviation. The post-RASP data set averaged 20% with a standard 
deviation of 11%. The AO's and AKE's were roughly the same between data 
sets. The AOE's showed the most variation between data sets. The pre-RASP 
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AO average was 20% with a 1% standard deviation. The average increases 10% 
post-RASP to a vessel utilization of 30% and a standard deviation of 13%. This 
increase was mainly driven by the 81% and 88% posted by USNS Rainier (T-
AOE-7) in 2013 quarters 3 and 4. Without these two quarters, the overall average 
and standard deviation would have been 21% and 5%, respectively, which are 
effectively the same as the pre-RASP numbers. Vessel utilization by CLF asset is 
shown in Figures 15 and 16. 
 
Figure 15.  2009 and 2010 Vessel Utilization by CLF Asset 
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Figure 16.  2013 and 2015 Vessel Utilization by CLF Asset 
D. FREIGHT RATE OBSERVATIONS 
Freight rate data sets are depicted in Tables 6 and 7. 2009 and 2010 
showed overall freight rate per m3 calculations of $101 with a standard deviation 
of $59. Post-RASP, the average freight rate was higher at $137 with a standard 
deviation of $59. Pre-RASP CLF asset comparisons showed an average $86 for 
the AO's, $180 for the AKE's, and $53 for the AOE's. 2013 and 2015 averages 
were $149, $156, and $53 for the AO's, AKE's, and AOE's respectively. While the 
AOE class averages were the same across pre- and post-RASP data sets, the 
telling metrics was the standard deviation. 2013 and 2015 variation was double 
that of the pre-RASP AOE figures. Pre- and post-RASP freight rates are depicted 
by individual ships in Figures 17 and 18. 
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Figure 17.  2009 and 2010 Freight Rate by CLF Asset 
 
Figure 18.  2013 and 2015 Freight Rate by CLF Asset 
E. SUPPLY AND DEMAND OBSERVATIONS 
Total supply and demand may be seen in Figures 9 and 10 and includes 
both U.S. and coalition resources. Supply at 14 knots dwarfs demand by a factor 
of 110:1 pre-RASP and then 102:1 post-RASP. In 2009 and 2010 the average 
demand was 45,011 m3 of commodity and the average supply was 4,951,291 m3 
of commodity. 2013 and 2015 averages were similar with demand at 47,116 m3 
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of commodity and the average supply as 4,819,137 m3 of commodity. The 
standard deviations for demand were 13,322 m3 and supply was 39,018 m3. 
Given this analysis, it may be assumed that supply and demand were equal 
through all quarters analyzed with minimal variation.  
F. SUPPLY AND DEMAND CONSIDERATIONS 
While it seems as though fewer provider ships might be able to supply the 
demand in the Fifth Fleet AOR based upon the supply and demand ratios, this is 
not necessarily the case. One must consider that every CLF asset is not capable 
of meeting RAS needs of every customer (due to speed restrictions, the AOE is 
the only asset capable of meeting the carrier strike groups massive demands). 
Consideration of the large distances and numerous chokepoints involved in the 
AOR is also important. It is roughly 1,000 nm from the North Red Sea to Djibouti, 
1,400 nm from Djibouti to the North Arabian Sea, and 800 nm from the North 
Arabian Sea to the Northern Persian Gulf with transits through the Straights of 
Bab al-Mandab and the Straits of Hormuz. Remember, all of the demand is filled 
through RAS events. Furthermore, the time required for each port evolution, each 
RAS event, each non-working leg, is not captured by pure supply and demand 
calculations. The CLF loses capacity by each of these operational facets. 
G. CONCLUSIONS 
The primary goal of this research was to establish a baseline of data to 
support future research. This goal has been accomplished through the collection, 
formatting, and analysis of 2009, 2010, 2013, and 2015 supply and demand 
models. Trends throughout the analysis of pre- and post-RASP models were 
generally inconsistent. This may be attributed to the analysis of only four years' 
worth of data. Also, the employment of CLF assets is largely dependent upon 
military operations taking place as this shifts the required demand. For example, 
air operations will drive the demand for JP-5 on the aircraft carrier up sharply. 
Given the inconsistencies, there is room for preliminary analysis that may help to 
focus further research. 
 44
The trends in overall effective work (OEW) were sporadic between pre-
RASP and post-RASP data sets. There was a slight increase to 14% from before 
to after RASP initialization. Quarter by quarter analysis shows an increase of 
efficiency during the second quarter in three of four years but there are no other 
observable consistencies. Figure 19 depicts the quarter over quarter model for 
each year. 
 
Figure 19.  Quarter by Quarter Efficiency Trends 
Assuming that the increase in efficiency was a legitimate increase, it is 
important to understand the driving factors involved. OEW has been previously 
defined as the product of vessel and voyage utilization. Since voyage utilization 
was consistent through each of the four years the conclusion is that vessel 
utilization was the determining factor. Vessel utilization is the total amount of 
commodity delivered in a voyage divided by the total commodity capacity of the 
CLF asset. Demand is finite in the AOR so it would seem that the efficiency is 
driven by the class of vessel used to meet the demand. Based on the data, the 
AOE is both the most efficient asset and has the lowest freight rates. The 
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problem is that there are a limited number of AOE's available and there is 
significant capital invested in the other classes of supply ships.  
This is where scheduling efficiency become important. It is imperative that 
the use and scheduling of the other CLF assets is handled with fiscal 
responsibility. There are examples of voyages involving AO’s and AKE’s that 
show OEW and freight rates comparable to those of their AOE counterparts. 
USNS Lenthall (TAO-189) posted several voyages in 2009 that may serve as an 
example as depicted in Tables 12 and 13. 
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In both of the above examples, USNS Lenthall (TAO-189) delivers high 
amounts of commodity while ensuring above average vessel utilization and 
voyage utilization. These examples seem to be outliers for the AO but a change 
in the way that schedulers organize the voyages could make these types of 
numbers more normal. Based upon this research, scheduling longer voyages 
that deliver larger total amounts of commodity will produce better results than 
shorter voyages that deliver small amounts. In doing so, the schedulers could 
bring real savings and fiscal maturity in the use of CLF assets. These savings 
would come from reduced fuel and underway costs for MSC as well as reducing 
the cost of transporting a cubic meter of commodity per nautical mile, which is 
the definition of the freight rate metric. While all of this assumes a pure logistical 
model, the reality is that the CLF is responsible for ensuring that the customer 
can meet its mission objectives, many of which are high priority, where maximum 
operational capacity is more important than efficiency. 
The freight rate metric serves as another barometer to effective 
scheduling efficiency. As previously mentioned, the AOE boasts consistently 
lower freight rates than the other classes and there appears to be several 
reasons for this. First, recall that the station vs shuttle ship concept uses the AOE 
as the on station ship with the carrier strike group. While the data suggests that 
the Fifth Fleet AOR trends away from this concept, there are examples of 
exceptional freight rates, vessel, and voyage utilization when the concept is put 
into practice. USNS Rainier's (TAOE-7) 2013 Quarter 3 voyages are an example 
of exceptional scheduling efficiency and are depicted in Tables 14 and 15. 
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Table 15.   USNS Rainier's (TAOE-7) 2013 Quarter 3 Voyage #2 
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USNS Rainier (TAOE-7) is able to remain on station for 43 and 33 days 
respectively thanks to refueling by the stations ships USNS Humphreys (TAO-
188), USNS Tippecanoe (TAO-199), and USNS Chavez (TAKE-14). Next, being 
the only CLF asset that can maintain speeds allowing it to keep with the aircraft 
carrier make it the asset of choice to refuel the USS Nimitz (CVN-68) carrier 
strike group during this period. This provides a dedicated source of very high 
demand unique to the AOE. It should be noted, however, that these voyages 
could possibly be classified as high priority vice purely logistical as the they were 
in support of operations in Syria (Shalal-Esra, 2013). 
The final conclusion is that coalition partners add an immense amount of 
supply and demand to the Fifth Fleet AOR. The coalition ships in theater add 
about 20% demand and 30% supply through all periods analyzed. The latter 
relieves American assets operationally and logistically. Figures 20 and 21 depict 
raw supply and demand percentages for both pre- and post-RASP. 
 
Figure 20.  Pre-RASP Coalition Supply and Demand 
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Figure 21.  Post-RASP Coalition Supply and Demand 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
Given the inconclusiveness of the trends encountered in the data sets, 
further research is required. The recommendation is to compile, format, and 
analyze data from 2011-2013 to fill out the pre-RASP data and conduct the same 
for 2014 and 2016 for the post-RASP data. 2011 has already been compiled and 
will be included with all forwarded data from this research. 
Furthermore, there is opportunity for more detailed cost information for the 
CLF voyage periods. Port costs were given a standard rate based upon the 
average port cost found in the LogSSR database but the number of days in port 
was not calculated. As port costs can potentially have important impacts, future 
research should focus on this aspect. The freight rates proposed in my research 
are most likely lower than those that include more detailed cost information. The 
same is true for underway CLF costs. Fuel costs were the only cost factors 
analyzed for underway periods. Maintenance, personnel, food, and consumable 
expenses increase the costs of CLF asset's underway periods. Again, this data 
was not considered in my research and likely resulted in lower freight rates. The 
final cost factor that may impact the trends would be fuel costs. This study used a 
standard rate for fuel in order to normalize data across the wide range of periods 
analyzed and did not normalize for inflation. Using actual fuel costs and 
normalizing for a base year inflation will improve the cost calculations found in 
this research. 
A better understanding of the impacts and benefits that coalition partners 
bring to the Fifth Fleet AOR is required. Discussions with schedulers have 
revealed that scheduling and coordinating with these ships is difficult at best. 
Data for coalition CLF assets was not as accurate as those in the U.S. inventory. 
This is why I was unable to include efficiency data and freight rate information  
for coalition supply ships in my data. The data showing when, where, and  
the amount of commodity transferred for coalition RAS events was accurate  
but most of their port call information was missing. Without this, the specific 
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voyage periods to perform the required calculations could not be defined. The 
recommendation is to better assimilate this data. 
RASP is an excellent tool that has great potential in the optimization of 
logistics support in the Fifth Fleet AOR. While this study's data shows minimal 
increase in efficiency at best, further research may provide different results. 
RASP affords an opportunity to collect and disseminate cumbersome data that 
was previously difficult to obtain. There are also intangible benefits the RASP 
brings to the table such as decreasing the work load on the schedulers, freeing 
them for other work. This increase in time allows for better coordination and 
communication with individual supply officers aboard ships and increases the 
scheduler's understanding of the customer's needs. 
While we place immense focus on operating CLF assets in the most 
efficient manner possible, the CLF is only but a subsystem in the overall 
Department of Defense system. Joint Publication 4-0 states that the imperatives 
of joint logistics are unity of effort, visibility and common processes, and rapid 
and precise response (Department of Defense [DOD], pp. I 8-9, 2013). Efficiency 
is only a small subset of a policy that values speed and reliability above all else. 
This is not wrong per se, but as the U.S. Navy shifts away from combat 
operations and into "presence" type missions, the mindset must shift as well, 
especially in times of fiscal uncertainty. There is a time for high op-tempo 
logistics that ensures the warfighter is ready and capable to bring the strength of 
the military arm to bear and we have proven that we are effective at that. There is 
also a time for fiscally minded efficient operations that resemble our commercial 
counterparts. It is here that the CLF must improve and RASP may be the tool to 
influence this shift. 
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